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SAŽETAK
Unatoč značaju sustava ranog upozorenja (SRU) 
u otkrivanju slabih signala pri promjenama oko-
line i doprinosa u unapređenju pravovremene 
poslovne pripremljenosti i odgovora na poslov-
ne izazove, posebice u trenucima poslovne krize, 
empirijski podaci - prije svega na razini država 
- pokazuju kašnjenja u praksi u odnosu na teo-
rijske prednosti SRU-a. Svrha ovoga znanstve-
nog rada jest doprinijeti praktičnim i teorijskim 
ABSTRACT
Despite the importance of early warning systems 
(EWS) in revealing weak signals on environmen-
tal changes and in constructing a solid base for 
timely and appropriate business response, parti-
cularly against the backdrop of business crises, 
empirical evidence - especially at the country 
level - still lags behind. The aim of this paper is to 
contribute to the practical and theoretical know-


































spoznajama o njemu u poduzećima putem 
empirijskog istraživanja provedenog na uzorku 
od triju europskih zemalja, tj. Hrvatske, Austrije 
i Grčke. Pretpostavljamo kako bogatije zemlje, 
mjereno prema terminima BDP-a, imaju viši stu-
panj implementacije SRU-a i češće koriste najsu-
vremenije, dok one s manjim BDP-om imaju nižu 
razinu razvoja i njihove implementacije. Nadalje, 
istraživanje je pokazalo uzroke neimplementacije 
SRU-a. U svrhu empirijskog istraživanja korišten je 
strukturirani upitnik. Unatoč postavljenoj hipote-
zi o razlikama među zemljama u razini BDP-a i ra-
zini implementacije SRU-a, ne postoje statistički 
značajne razlike među zemljama. Međutim 
među zemljama postoje određene razlike u vr-
stama i prioritetima SRU-a. Možemo konstatirati 
kako su oni u provedenom istraživanju uglav-
nom kratkoročno usmjereni, s naglaskom na 
operativnim ciljevima u poduzećima u sve tri 
zemlje. Glavni razlog njihove neimplementacije 
u poduzećima jest manjak zaposlenika i nedo-
statak menadžerskih inicijativa. 
ce from companies located in three diff erent Eu-
ropean countries, i.e. Croatia, Austria and Greece. 
We propose that companies in richer countries, 
as measured in terms of GDP, have a higher im-
plementation level of EWS and are more likely 
to meet current state-of-the-art EWS standards 
while companies in the countries with a lower 
GDP show a lesser level of development. Moreo-
ver, we explore the reasons for not implemen-
ting EWS. For our survey we used a structured 
questionnaire. Contrary to our hypotheses, there 
are no signifi cant diff erences among the coun-
tries concerning the level of EWS implementa-
tion. However, there are some diff erences as to 
the kind of EWS. Overall, EWS are predominately 
short-term oriented and operating in all three 
countries. The main reasons for not implemen-
ting EWS are the shortage of employees and the 


























The need for early warning systems (EWS) basi-
cally results from suddenly occurring incidents, 
i.e. the energy crisis in the late 1970s1 or the 2008 
global fi nancial crisis that is striking for a broad 
range of reasons, including most obviously its 
speed (dynamic) and severity.2 During the last 
decades, new and unexpected environmental 
trends and developments caught numerous 
fi rms unprepared and induced several forms of 
business crises. According to literature, compa-
nies’ reactions to such crises were basically two-
fold: companies either managed to recognize 
emerging environmental signs in time and inter-
pret them in an appropriate way or they failed to 
correctly assess their importance and, thus, to-
tally ignored them.3 It is well-acknowledged that 
by recognizing and uncovering the signs of a cri-
sis in time, companies may be able to avert the 
crisis or at least minimize both potential negative 
eff ects and the time span of the crisis. Indeed, 
there are fi ndings in research which support 
the view that signs of a business crisis manifest 
themselves already about four years before the 
crisis becomes apparent or before the eff ects of 
the crisis are felt by companies in one way or an-
other.4
 
EWS are among the most important and most 
prominent tools used for assessing environ-
mental challenges, chances and threats, and 
for simultaneously enhancing appropriate reac-
tions in a timely manner.5 Since the severity and 
the speed of environmental changes may vary 
from country to country, the need for and the 
requirements to use EWS might diff er, too. Thus, 
the EWS should be and are implemented against 
a country-specifi c background in order to gain 
competitive advantages.6 Despite the increased 
attention that the concept of EWS has received 
in recent decades, there is no common standard 
with regard to the importance or the organiza-
tion of EWS in diff erent countries. This is mainly 
due to the fact that the conceptualization of the 
term depends on a number of country-specifi c 
characteristics, such as the level of awareness 
at the micro and macro, country level, the per-
ceived importance and, further, the know-how, 
know-what, know-who and know-when dimen-
sions involved in the EWS implementation phase. 
Furthermore, there is limited empirical evidence 
in this area, particularly at the country level.  
The aim of the present paper is to fi ll this gap 
by empirically exploring the perception of EWS 
concerning their characteristics, importance 
and role in companies located in three Euro-
pean countries, i.e. Austria, Croatia and Greece. 
It is not our aim to statistically report on the way 
the adoption of EWS tools is associated with the 
surveyed companies’ characteristics but to ex-
plore country diff erences. To this end, we pro-
pose that companies in more mature countries 
(i.e. those with a higher GDP, more advanced de-
velopment of business practices) have a greater 
EWS implementation level and are more likely to 
meet the current state-of-the-art EWS standards 
while companies in less mature countries (i.e. 
those with a lower GDP, poorer development 
of business practices) show lower EWS imple-
mentation levels. Moreover, we explore the rea-
sons discouraging the companies in these three 
countries to implement EWS. Our survey is a fi rst 
attempt at capturing the way in which the EWS 
are conceived by practitioners in the context of 
diff erent European countries. The results of our 
survey should provide valuable insights not only 
for further research but also to the practitioners 
who are in charge of and work with EWS in vari-
ous industry groups and government agencies, 
particularly those involved in cross-country or-
ganizational structures and business relation-
ships. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical 
background on EWS by outlining major char-
acteristics, elements and the role of EWS in 
current business practice. The hypotheses are 
developed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the 
research method and the survey process. The 
results of the empirical survey are presented in 
Section 5. Section 6 discusses the results and 
outlines some implications for theory and prac-
tice.  Finally, the limitations of the survey and a 




































2.1. Characteristics of EWS
The concept of strategic EWS was fi rst introduced 
in business literature by Ansoff .7 It coincided with 
such concepts as strategic issues management 
and trends management. Ansoff  based his prop-
osition for strategic EWS on the realization that 
discontinuities in the technological, economic, 
social and political environment of businesses 
appear neither at random nor unpredictably. In 
particular, he claimed that since such discontinu-
ities are mobilized by humans and in accordance 
with their interests, they are presumably spotted 
by means of weak signals refl ected in business 
environments. “Weak signals” are inadequately 
defi ned and vaguely structured information, 
which forewarns the occurrence of strategic 
discontinuities due to changes in environmen-
tal trends (e.g. changes in consumer behavior).8 
While strong signals are suffi  ciently visible and 
concrete, weak signals are imprecise early indi-
cators about pending impactful events.9 Com-
panies that continuously monitor their environ-
ment and keep an eye on weak signals are better 
equipped to anticipate changes and are familiar 
with emerging challenges, which are not per-
ceived as unexpected situations but rather as 
foreseen events. If weak signals are recognized 
in time and are properly interpreted, adequate 
precautions might be taken in advance.10
In this context, the role of EWS consists in pre-
dicting the timing of relevant environmental 
developments11 and in increasing a company’s 
fl exibility to quickly adjust its internal structures 
to changes in the environment.12 These changes 
might be threats as well as opportunities.13 One 
of the major tasks of a EWS is to monitor and 
detect the aforementioned weak signals in the 
company’s internal and external environment. 
The information on weak signals it gathers has to 
be transmitted to relevant decision-makers, who 
should be able to make appropriate decisions in 
the best interest of the entire company and take 
preventive actions. However, the role of EWS is 
not limited to displaying environmental change 
in a company’s fi nancial indicators only but is also 
concerned with the identifi cation of the causes 
Figure 1: Key roles of early warning systems (EWS) 
Source: Bickhoff , N. Blatz, M., Eilenberger, G., Haghani, S., Krause, K.-J. (Eds): Die Unternehmenskrise als 

























of such changes. In addition to this kind of back-
ward analysis, EWS are also oriented towards the 
future. By assessing possible consequences on 
the company and acknowledging future chang-
es, it may be easier and more likely to initiate ap-
propriate and eff ective counter measures. Finally, 
since EWS force decision-making managers to 
deal with external opportunities and threats on 
the one hand and internal strengths and weak-
nesses on the other, managers become more 
sensitive to changes and are more likely to de-
velop creative capabilities directed towards re-
straining and avoiding threats as well as towards 
positively responding to opportunities.14 Figure 1 
summarizes the role and tasks of EWS.
First approaches to EWS date back to the1960s 
and primarily to the fi eld of international politics. 
Thus, they were initially envisioned as a tool for 
predicting political changes, especially the geo-
political crises, and were developed for the pur-
pose of strategic planning. The starting point of 
EWS is often seen in Aguilar’s concept of environ-
mental scanning that is part of the strategic issue 
management and directed at the future orien-
tation of a company’s development.15 As shown 
in Figure 2, there are three major generations of 
EWS, commonly distinguished in literature.16
While EWS of the fi rst and second generation 
were predominately oriented towards the inter-
nal aspects of companies and its operational is-
sues, the area of interest has broadened steadily 
in the past few decades. At the very beginning 
of EWS, only a limited number of quantitative key 
performance indicators for planning and control 
were implemented in order to reveal any devia-
tions between planned and emergent fi gures. 
Thus, the fi rst generation of EWS was strongly 
inspired by traditional information and control 
systems; hence, a further development of tra-
ditional management accounting practice.17 
This point of view was extended by the second 
generation of EWS which added predominately 
quantitative early warning indicators in order to 
reveal risky and/or promising developments be-
fore their eff ects became apparent to the com-
pany. The crucial incentive for the last generation 
of EWS came from the previously mentioned 
concept of weak signals by Ansoff .18 Weak signals 
and strategic, relevant information must be as-
sessed and utilized in order to reveal potential 
risks and opportunities both within the com-
pany and in its immediate and wider environ-
ment. Furthermore, there must be appropriate 
reactions to the identifi ed signals.19 In contrast 
to the early approaches, which are subsumed 
under operational EWS, last generation EWS are 
characterized by a stronger focus on strategic is-
sues, with early warning indicators both quanti-
tative and qualitative in nature. Some references 
distinguish between third and fourth generation 
EWS, where the fourth generation is a bit more 
focused on a holistic perspective of prior ap-
proaches while also dealing more explicitly with 
the link between strategic and operational issues 
and with methodological guidelines for practical 
purposes.20
Figure 2: Generations of EWS
Source: Horvath, 1991, pp. 421-422; Gleißner and Füser, 2002, pp. 226-227; Welge and Al-Laham, 2008, 


































2.2.  Relevance of EWS in 
current business practice
The need for third generation EWS basically 
results from discontinuities, environmental dy-
namics and strategic surprises.21 In fact, due to 
the internationalization of global economic ac-
tivities and world capital economic fl ows, today’s 
companies face a highly complex, dynamic and, 
thus, unpredictable environment. In this con-
text, complexity and dynamics are twofold: First, 
there are somewhat “regular” environmental 
conditions. Burkhart,22 for example, refers to the 
fact that a fi rm’s life cycle stages are important 
when assessing the complexity and dynamic as 
well as the infl uence of the environment on the 
fi rm. Furthermore, some industries such as the IT 
industry exhibit a very short life cycle time span 
and, consequently, fi rms operating in this indus-
try face high turbulences. By contrast, the situa-
tion in the automobile and the airplane industry 
regarding life cycle time span is somewhat more 
stable. Second, there are selective incidents that 
impose a sudden and unforeseen pressure on 
fi rms. Such suddenly occurring incidents, e.g. 
the 2008 global fi nancial crisis, are particularly 
striking for a broad range of reasons, including 
most obviously their speed (dynamic) and sever-
ity.23 Independent of the source of complexity 
and dynamics, the amount of time available to 
identify weak signals and to react in an appropri-
ate way decreases with complexity and dynam-
ics while, simultaneously, more time is required 
to recognize all dimensions and consequences 
of specifi c decisions. As shown in Figure 3, a con-
siderable “time gap” between the time required 
for effi  cient decision-making and the time avail-
able must be assumed. The more complex and 
dynamic a fi rm’s environment is, the more diffi  -
cult it is for the fi rm to adjust to changes and the 
more intense the pressure placed upon EWS to 
close that time gap. 
Having said that, a crucial factor for the eff ec-
tiveness of EWS with regard to the prevention of 
business crises and to taking advantage of new 
opportunities is apparently time.24 In this context, 
time refers to the time span between the occur-
rence of an incident and its perception by the 
fi rm. As time goes by, the information on possible 
opportunities and threats increases and signals 
become stronger; simultaneously, the range of 
possible actions and their scope decreases while 
the costs of action increase.25 Since the available 
knowledge and the awareness of both “regular” 
environmental changes and suddenly occurring 
incidents, such as crises, determine the strategy 
Figure 3: Time gap

























response and its applicable range, the sooner a 
fi rm recognizes the signals which indicate a cri-
sis, the better positioned it is to maneuver and 
the less damaging the impact of the crisis on the 
fi rm’s sustainability. When decision-makers are 
given enough time to consider and initiate the 
largest possible number of appropriate counter 
measures, more time will presumably be spent 
on strategic and operational business planning 
and, thus, signifi cant losses and missed business 
opportunities may be avoided.26
3. HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
Crises, such as the aforementioned 2008 global 
fi nancial crisis, aff ect countries and their busi-
nesses to diff erent extents. Although various 
research eff orts have been made to explain the 
causes of a global (fi nancial) crisis, there is no 
clear evidence yet that the severity of a crisis dif-
fers across countries.27 Nonetheless, it must be 
expected that the challenges from crises and 
environmental changes are realized and expe-
rienced in diff erent ways and with diff erent im-
pacts, according to the fi rm’s country-specifi c 
background. Country-related crisis correlates 
used in literature include country-specifi c char-
acteristics, such as the fi nancial policy, fi nancial 
conditions, international imbalance, macroeco-
nomic policies, institutional factors, geography.28 
Countries with a lower GDP level, GDP per capita 
and GDP growth rate, with a weak economy and 
high rates of unemployment, i.e. Croatia and 
Greece compared to Austria, are more often ob-
served to come off  worse in crises. This may be 
explained by the fact that these countries tend to 
be more dependent on imports and more wide-
ly exposed to spillover eff ects from the crises 
aff ecting other countries.29 Furthermore, since 
limited human and fi nancial resources represent 
a critical barrier to the implementation of the risk 
management systems such as EWS,30 countries 
with lower GDP levels presumably do not attain 
state-of-the-art business practices due to the 
lack of necessary resources. Although there is a 
higher pressure from crises on those countries 
and a greater need for counter-measures such 
as EWS, richer countries, i.e. Austria compared to 
Croatia and Greece,31 have an advantage over the 
countries with a lower GDP in responding to cri-
ses.32 Countries with a higher GDP level are more 
likely to have larger funds available to tap into 
in times of need as well as more resources and 
means to meet upcoming challenges, particu-
larly in fi nancial terms, as regards the time pres-
sure etc. On the other hand, they are assumingly 
more likely to have state-of-the-art EWS business 
practices in place. Thanks to a more advanced 
country development and prosperity, compa-
nies in these countries may have existed longer 
and accumulated more experience, for example, 
concerning the implementation of various man-
agement systems and practices such as EWS. In 
view of these considerations, it can be assumed 
that the level of development and implementa-
tion of EWS diff ers across countries, even among 
the companies that have their operations in dif-
ferent European countries. Thus, we defi ne our 
fi rst hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Companies in the countries with a 
higher GDP level, i.e. Austria, show a higher level of 
EWS implementation than companies in the coun-
tries with a lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and Greece.
Concerning the kind of EWS, we refer to the three 
generations of EWS presented in Section 2 and, 
thus, roughly distinguish operational, short-term 
EWS from strategic, long-term EWS. The former 
kind corresponds to the fi rst and second genera-
tion of EWS and, thus, is traditionally designed 
for control purposes and management account-
ing in operational management practice.33 Op-
erational EWS are implemented with the help 
of special information systems, which signal 
the latent opportunities or threats by means of 
predominately quantitative information. They 
include short-term concepts and tools, such as 
the balance sheet, planning activities at a week-
ly, monthly and annual level, fi nancial indicators 
(i.e. economic, profi tability, liquidity indicators), 
monitoring and control.34 In contrast to the op-


































management practice uses strategic EWS and 
follows a rather long-term perspective with 
the aim to develop and maintain potentials for 
future success.35 The purpose of strategic EWS 
is to identify the aforementioned weak signals 
well in advance, to make strategic discontinuities 
and strategic surprises assessable and to predict 
them before negative consequences become 
even visible. Consequently, strategic EWS aim at 
enhancing the active management of risks and 
opportunities. The information that is relevant in 
strategic EWS is both qualitative and quantitative. 
The most prominent concepts and tools used in 
strategic EWS include environmental, industry 
and market analysis, management analysis, po-
tential analysis, SWOT analysis, Balanced Score-
card and risk management.36 Correspondingly 
to Hypothesis 1, we assume that companies in 
the countries with a higher level of development 
are also more advanced with regard to business 
practices. Thus, we defi ne our second hypoth-
esis:
Hypothesis 2: Companies in the countries with a 
lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and Greece compared 
to Austria, are more likely to use fi rst and second 
generation EWS, or predominately short-term and 
operational EWS, while companies in the countries 
with a higher GDP level, i.e. Austria compared to 
Croatia and Greece, are more likely to use third gen-
eration EWS, or both operational, short-term EWS 
and strategic, long-term EWS.
In order to show the occurrence of change and 
the development of new trends in the short- and 
long-term perspective while announcing an up-
coming crisis before its eff ects become appar-
ent and initiating early strategic interventions 
in operational and strategic business practice, 
early warning indicators are mostly applied. Early 
warning indicators are auxiliary values for iden-
tifying risks and opportunities in early stages. 
They are expected to meet such requirements 
as singularity, completeness, timely availabil-
ity of information and economic justifi cation.37 
Companies usually consider several fundamen-
tal indicators which they see as crucial and vi-
tal for their business survival.38 The operational 
management is directed towards short-term 
key performance indicators, such as liquidity 
and profi t, liquidity planning, incoming orders 
indicator, leading products indicator, indicators 
of business climate and employees.39 In accord-
ance with the explanations provided in Section 
2 and correspondingly to Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
we assume that fi rst and second generation EWS 
focus predominately on quantitative, short-term 
early warning indicators that primarily portray 
the fi rm and its immediate environment. By con-
trast, third generation EWS have an extended 
view, incorporating the fi rm and its immediate 
environment as well as a wider environment of 
the fi rm. For this reason, a broader range of indi-
cators is incorporated and both quantitative and 
qualitative early warning indicators are included 
in the EWS. On the basis of these assumptions, 
our third hypothesis is split in two parts:
Hypothesis 3a: Companies in the countries with a 
lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and Greece compared 
to Austria, are more likely to use very few early warn-
ing indicators while companies in the countries with 
a higher GDP level, i.e. Austria compared to Croatia 
and Greece, are more likely to use a larger number of 
early warning indicators. 
Hypothesis 3b: Companies in the countries with a 
lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and Greece compared 
to Austria, are more likely to use fi nancial early 
warning indicators only while companies in the 
countries with a higher GDP level, i.e. Austria com-
pared to Croatia and Greece, are more likely use a 
broader range of early warning indicators. 
4. RESEARCH METHOD 
AND PROCESS
The aim of our research was to investigate the 
country-specifi c role and importance of EWS on 
the one hand, and the state-of-the-art advance 
of implemented EWS in companies located in 
three selected European countries on the other 

























on the fundamental assumption that business 
practices diff ers across countries with regard to 
EWS because of the diff erences in the countries’ 
general level of development and economic 
strength. For this purpose, we conducted a 
large scale empirical survey, using a traditional 
questionnaire. Since the results presented in this 
paper are a part of a wider fi eld of study on en-
trepreneurial fi rms concerning the role of con-
trolling in the area of tension between profi t and 
sustainability, the entire questionnaire consisted 
of a broader range of items than those reported 
here. In total, there were 43 closed questions. For 
the purpose of the present research, we extract-
ed only nine questions, of which fi ve focus on 
EWS and related issues and four questions deal 
with demographic issues. The questionnaire was 
developed by the authors of the paper according 
to the research objectives and using the support 
of six co-researchers, who are experts in particu-
lar fi elds and who added three to four questions 
each in their fi eld of expertise. The questionnaire 
had not been used in previous studies by the 
authors or by the other researchers. There are 
three types of questions: (1) multiple response 
questions, where each question had several pos-
sible answers, of which either only one answer or 
multiple answers could be chosen, (2) yes-or-no 
questions and (3) rating questions, which had to 
be answered on a 5-point Likert scale. The scales 
were developed by the authors according to the 
aim of the survey and the research hypotheses. 
The empirical research was conducted in com-
panies in Austria, Croatia and Greece throughout 
2010 and early in 2011. The questionnaires were 
distributed by electronic mail. Participants were 
informed that the survey was totally anonymous 
and that its results would be used for the pur-
pose of scientifi c research only. In the course of 
2010 and in early 2011, with a few iterations, we 
received a total of 126 questionnaires, i.e. 16 from 
Austria (94% response rate), 31 from Greece (89% 
response rate), 79 from Croatia (8.78% response 
rate). The questionnaire was predominantly an-
swered by the managers in charge of control-
ling and fi nance, particularly in Austrian and 
Croatian companies. In Greek companies there 
were a considerable number of respondents in 
other positions as well as board members and 
presidents. Thus, the majority of respondents in 
our survey have to deal with EWS in practice and 
are, hence, familiar with the subject. In this sense, 
they appear to be in charge of the monitoring 
and implementation of several types of EWS, 
even though in the Greek sample, the respond-
ents are in diff erent managerial positions than in 
Croatian and Austrian sample.
In preparing the results, a number of scientifi c 
research methods using SPSS were applied, in 
particular frequency statistics, analysis of vari-
ance (Anova) and Chi square tests.
5. RESULTS 
Below, we present the results of our survey. First, 
we give an overview of the profi le of the com-
panies that took part in our survey. Thus, we re-
port their main business activity, company size, 
ownership structure and respondents’ position 
within the company. By providing such detailed 
information, we shed further light on country-
specifi c characteristics and aim at corroborat-
ing diff erences among the countries that are 
assumed on the basis of economic data, as out-
lined in Section 3. Second, we test the hypoth-
eses elaborated above. Third, additional evalu-
ations provide further explanations concerning 
both confi rmed and rejected hypotheses. 
5.1. Company profi le
Across all three countries, most respondents 
worked in the processing industry (28%), retail 
and wholesale (15%) and in the fi nancial industry 
(10.5%). However, when asked about their busi-
ness activity, almost one quarter of the com-
panies indicated “other”, including e.g. public 
service and defense, social insurance, education, 
healthcare, community and personal services. 


































respondents are not equally distributed in the 
three countries. Construction industry is more 
strongly represented in the Croatian sample but 
less frequent in the Greek sample and complete-
ly missing in the Austrian sample. The processing 
industry is slightly less frequent in the Austrian 
sample while the hotel and restaurant industry 
as well as the fi nancial industry are more domi-
nant in the Greek sample. Both these industries 
appear to be less frequent in Croatia and Aus-
tria.  
Figure 4: Business activity of respondent com-
panies
To classify companies with regard to their size, 
we adopted a defi nition issued by the Europe-
an Union in the Commission Recommendation 
2003/361/EC which is based on the staff  head-
count and turnover, or on balance-sheet total. A 
small company is defi ned as a company which 
employs fewer than 50 persons and whose an-
nual turnover and/or annual balance sheet total 
does not exceed EUR 10 million. A medium-
sized company is defi ned as a company which 
employs fewer than 250 persons and whose an-
nual turnover does not exceed EUR 50 million or 
whose annual balance-sheet total does not ex-
ceed EUR 43 million. According to this defi nition, 
most companies in our sample can be defi ned 
as large companies with more than 250 employ-
ees. On average, about 48% of all companies in 
the sample across all three countries were large 
companies and about 20% were small compa-
nies with fewer than 50 employees. In this re-
spect, we identifi ed some diff erences among 
the three countries. Namely, the Croatian and 
the Austrian sample were dominated by large 
companies (58% and 43%) while the Greek sam-
ple included mostly small companies, account-
ing for 39% of the total surveyed, compared to 
21% in the Austrian and only 13% in the Croatian 
sample. A Chi square test showed the diff erences 
among sample countries to be signifi cant (χ2 = 
11.334, df = 4, p = .023).
Besides company size, the ownership structure 
also varied considerably among the three coun-
tries. On average, private (local) and mainly pri-
vate (local) companies were represented with 
around 63% in our sample while both privately 
owned foreign companies and state-owned 
companies represented around 16% of the total. 
Companies in the Greek sample, however, were 
almost exclusively local and privately owned 
(90%) and, thus, diff ered considerably from the 
companies in the Croatian and the Austrian sam-
ple which were quite similar with regard to the 
ownership structure. In contrast to the Greek 
sample, only around 45% of both the Croatian 
and the Austrian sample was accounted for by 
local, privately owned companies, with 27-33% 
privately owned but foreign companies and 
20-25% (mainly) state-owned companies. There 
were no state-owned companies in the Greek 
sample. Although these diff erences are signifi -
cant according to a Chi square test (χ2 = 18.749, df 
= 4, p = .001), they were not surprising because 
the major part of the Greek sample consisted of 
small companies, which are presumably privately 
owned. 
5.2. Hypotheses testing
In Hypothesis 1 we stated that companies in the 
countries with a higher GDP level, i.e. Austria 
compared to Croatia and Greece, show a higher 

























Figure 5: Type and importance of implemented EWS
(1=not implemented at all, 5=fully implemented)
countries with a lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and 
Greece compared to Austria. The results of our 
survey revealed that more than a half of the com-
panies across all three samples had implemented 
EWS. The same was true for each country, where 
even more than 60% of the companies in the 
Croatian sample indicated that they implement 


































in the Greek sample. A Chi square test revealed 
no signifi cant diff erences among the three coun-
tries (χ2 = .890, df = 2, p = .641). Consequently, our 
fi rst hypothesis was not supported. 
In Hypothesis 2 we argued that companies in the 
countries with a lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and 
Greece compared to Austria, are more likely to 
use fi rst and second generation, that is, predom-
inately short-term and operational EWS while 
those in the countries with a higher GDP level, 
i.e. Austria compared to Croatia and Greece, are 
more likely to use third generation – both op-
erational, short-term EWS and strategic, long-
term EWS. In Pogreška! Izvor reference nije 
pronađen. 5 the frequency of strategic EWS 
instruments is presented in the upper half of 
the diagram while the frequency of operational 
EWS instruments is presented in the lower half. 
On average, the latter are more frequently used 
by companies in all the three countries. Thus, the 
instruments and analyses used in practice more 
likely correspond to the EWS of earlier genera-
tions than to the current state-of-the-art. Explor-
ing the diff erences among countries, an Anova 
test (see Appendix Table A 1) reveals signifi cant 
diff erences with regard to three operational in-
struments and one strategic instrument only: 
First, Croatian companies execute continuous 
planning and divergence monitoring signifi cant-
ly more frequently on a two-weeks’ basis than 
do Austrian and Greek companies. Second, on 
the contrary, Croatian companies engage signifi -
cantly less frequently in a continuous monitoring 
of accomplished profi ts and of the divergences 
from planned profi ts while Austrian companies 
pay most attention to this kind of EWS-element. 
Third, fi nancial and development analysis are 
signifi cantly more prominent in Croatian and 
Austrian than in Greek companies. Finally, at the 
strategic level, indebtedness indicators are used 
predominately by Croatian companies and to a 
lesser extent by Austrian and Greek companies. 
Although signifi cant diff erences among these 
countries concerning the type of EWS elements 
used are apparently rare, some tendencies have 
been revealed. Concerning the aforementioned 
quantitative short-term orientation, Greek com-
panies can be said to be a bit less engaged in 
this fi eld than Austrian and Croatian companies. 
Furthermore, contrary to our expectations, re-
sults indicate that Croatian and Greek companies 
show a slightly higher level of EWS implementa-
tion than Austrian companies. Surprisingly, Aus-
trian companies tend to care slightly less about 
strategic instruments, such as the analysis of 
management quality, continuous competition 
and industry analysis, marketing concept analysis 
and product line analysis. Finally, Croatian com-
panies in particular tend to be more concerned 
about both short- and long-term EWS elements 
and about operational and strategic EWS ele-
ments. Consequently, our second hypothesis 
was not supported.
Our third hypothesis was split into two parts. We 
proposed that companies in the countries with 
a lower GDP level, i.e. Croatia and Greece com-
pared to Austria, are more likely to use (a) fewer 
early warning indicators and (b) predominately 
fi nancial early warning indicators while compa-
nies in the countries with a higher GDP level, 
i.e. Austria compared to Croatia and Greece, are 
more likely use a larger number and a broader 
range of early warning indicators. With regard 
to the quantity of indicators used, companies 
of the Austrian sample indicated that they use 
more than ten indicators (see Figure 6 and Ap-
pendix Table A 2) signifi cantly more frequently 
than Croatian and Greek companies. On the con-
trary, Greek companies rarely use more than ten 
indicators. Thus, Hypothesis 3a was supported.
Concerning the type of early warning indicators 
(see Figure 6), fi nancial indicators are apparently 
the type of indicators that is most frequently used 
in the process of planning, control and report-
ing across all three countries. Most participating 
companies use fi ve to ten fi nancial indicators, 
and these are signifi cantly more frequently used 
by Greek companies. Thus, the fi nancial point of 
view dominates in EWS in all the three countries. 
With regard to the indicators other than fi nancial, 
the majority of companies use fewer than fi ve 
indicators. There is only one exception: around 

























fi ve to ten market and consumer indicators. Over-
all, however, Greek companies use non-fi nancial 
early warning indicators less frequently than do 
Austrian and Croatian companies. Business proc-
ess indicators are predominately used in Austria 
while employee and innovation indicators are 
signifi cantly more frequently used by Croatian 
companies. Since Greek companies diff er sig-
nifi cantly from Austrian and Croatian companies, 
with no apparent diff erence between the latter 
two, Hypothesis 3b was partly supported. 
agree about some reasons. As shown in Figure 
7, respondent companies in Austria, Croatia and 
Greece were unanimous in stating that there are 
not enough employees to monitor and analyze 
early warning indicators. Furthermore, most com-
panies believed the fi nancial indicators currently 
used in reports to be suffi  cient. While Greek and 
Croatian companies complained about the lack 
of management initiative, Austrian companies 
regarded it as a minor problem. They rather re-
ferred to the diffi  culties in integrating strategic 
Figure 6:  Relevant indicators in planning, control and reporting (response frequencies in %)
5.3. Additional evaluations
In some additional analyses we aimed at explor-
ing why companies do not implement EWS. 
Companies in all the three countries completely 
EWS into existing systems. Greek companies also 
indicated the benefi ts of strategic systems for the 
company to be largely unknown. Overall, Austrian 
companies apparently fi nd the largest number of 
reasons for not implementing EWS while Croatian 
companies indicated fewer reasons for it on aver-
age compared to the Austrian and Greek sample. 
Even though our survey revealed a lack of man-
agement initiative, board members and top man-
agement were found to be the main EWS users 
in Greek and Croatian companies. In Austrian 
companies department managers and the mid-
dle management are a little bit more engaged 
in EWS although, overall, managers and board 
members are apparently most involved in EWS 
in Austrian companies if compared to Greek and 
Croatian companies. As Figure 8 indicates, section 
managers and lower management as well as the 
president of the board and CEOs are compara-
tively more involved in EWS in Croatian than they 
are in Greek or Austrian companies. Thus, we may 
assume that EWS are viewed from a more holis-
tic perspective by integrating a higher number of 
management levels in Croatian companies. 



































Figure 8: Users of EWS
6. DISCUSSION AND 
CONCLUSION
Our research was directed towards providing 
empirical evidence in business practice with 
special regard to EWS in three selected European 
countries, i.e. Austria, Croatia and Greece. The aim 
was to explore diff erences in the level of EWS de-
velopment as well as in the perceptions and at-
titudes of respondents against the background 
of their respective country. Since our survey is a 
fi rst attempt at capturing the way in which EWS 
are conceived by practitioners in the context of 
diff erent European countries, we consider our re-
sults preliminary and exploratory. 
We defi ned three major hypotheses. First, we 
proposed that companies in more mature and 
richer countries, e.g. with a higher GDP level (i.e. 
Austria compared to Croatia and Greece) have a 
higher EWS implementation level. Second, we 
aimed at verifying that companies in richer coun-
tries are more likely to meet current state-of-the-
art EWS standards, that is that they use third gen-
eration EWS. Third, subsequently to Hypothesis 
2, we assumed that companies in the countries 
with a higher GDP level presumably apply third 
generation EWS and use both a larger number 
and a broader range of early warning indicators. 
Contrary to our assumptions, the EWS imple-
mentation level does not diff er among Austrian, 
Croatian and Greek companies in our sample. 
Thus, the countries with a lower GDP level do not 
lag behind the countries with a higher GDP. An ex-
planation might lie in the fact that a higher pres-
sure from crises on the countries with a lower GDP 
and a greater need for counter-measures such as 
EWS push the companies in these countries to 
improve their business practices and implement 
EWS. Since the countries with a lower GDP level 
are traditionally known to be hit worse by crises, 
this fi nding might possibly indicate promising fu-
ture prospects for both companies and individu-
als in Croatia and particularly Greece. 
Similar assumptions are possible about future 
developments with regard to the kind and im-
portance of various EWS elements. Companies 
of all three country samples showed a tendency 
towards a short-term perspective and an op-
erational approach to EWS. Although current 
state-of-the-art business practices includes both 
operational and strategic elements, the latter 
are still largely ignored by most of the surveyed 
companies. Surprisingly, though, Croatian and 
Greek companies appear to be more engaged in 
any kind of EWS element than Austrian compa-
nies even with regard to the strategic business 
practice, where Austrian companies see par-
ticular problems concerning the integration of 
strategic EWS into existing systems. Thus, again 
we may possibly assume that companies in the 
countries with a higher GDP level do not domi-
nate over those in the countries with a lower GDP 
level when it comes to the organization of EWS. 
However, we also identifi ed some diff erences. 
Austrian companies seemed to be a bit more fa-
miliar with EWS by using more of them; but, like 
their Croatian and Greek counterparts, they also 
believed the fi nancial indicators currently used 
for reporting to be quite suffi  cient while also 
seeming to be slightly more open to qualitative 
approaches than Greek companies in particular. 
We might explain this probably by the fact that 
Austria is slightly closer to other Western coun-
tries in economic terms and, thus, may be more 
inspired by the advances in business practices. 
Since Austrian and Croatian companies establish 

























the company, we might expect enhancements 
in the EWS organization and implementation to 
be more promising in these countries. By con-
trast, it appears to be more problematic in Greek 
companies, which lag behind both in terms of 
the level of development and the recognition of 
potential benefi ts of (strategic) EWS. 
Although the results of all conducted analyses 
consistently point to slight diff erences between 
Greek companies on the one hand and Austrian 
and Croatian companies on the other hand, there 
are some limitations to our survey. First, the Greek 
sample consisted of an above-average number 
of small, predominately privately owned and lo-
cal companies while the Austrian and Croatian 
sample were dominated by large companies. This 
might account for some distortions in our results. 
Second, the country samples were somewhat 
unbalanced with regard to the number of partici-
pants, business activity of surveyed companies, 
company size and ownership structure. Future 
research is recommended to build on an equal 
contribution from each country. 
Overall, however, the research showed a consider-
able potential to enhance the implementation of 
EWS in companies in all the three countries since 
40-50% of the surveyed companies have not im-
plemented EWS yet. With the lack of employees 
to run EWS, monitor and analyze early warning 
indicators as the most cited reason for this defi cit, 
human resource managers may be required to set 
initiatives. Apart from that, what also appears to be 
required is a change in the reasoning on the part 
of leading decision-makers in companies. Due to 
the fact that a lack of managerial initiative prevents 
most companies from implementing EWS, a fun-
damental reconsideration at the top level would 
encourage prospective instruments and actions 
with regard to this issue. Further recommenda-
tions arising from our results relate especially to 
the challenges in education and know-how with 
a view to raising the awareness of the need for a 
wider implementation of EWS and an integrative 
business management that balances between 
operational and strategic business orientation. 
These recommendations are predominately ad-
dressed to the main users of EWS, as identifi ed in 
our survey, but also to other practitioners in vari-
ous industry groups and government agencies, 
in particular to those who are involved in cross-
country organizational structures and business 
relationships.
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APPENDIX
Table A: ANOVA test - Country, type and importance of EWS
Table B: ANOVA test for: Country and relevant indicators in planning, control and reporting
